The Bargaining Problem Revisited
Minimum Utility Point, Restricted Monotonicity Axiom, and the Mean as an Estimate of Expected Utility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283607 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dan S Felsenthal (0000-0002-7713-7246, University of Haifa), Abraham Diskin (Political Science Department, The Hebrew University) |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 664-691 |
| Publication date | 1982-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002782026004005 |
| OpenAlex | W2145864102 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 20 |
On the basis of the results obtained by different experiments testing two-person bargaining situations, it is reasonable to assume that under certain circumstances bargainers are more likely to refer to a “minimum utility point” in forming their strategies, and hence reach different agreements than as hitherto suggested in the literature, e.g., the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The employment of such a minimum utility point is not merely descriptive, but normative, and should be viewed as a modification of the Pareto-optimum axiom, as well as other axioms, applicable in certain bargaining situations. It is also argued that such a modification is more reasonable than Kalai and Smorodinsky's axiom of monotonicity, which they suggested should replace Nash's axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is suggested that many real-life, as well as laboratory, two-person bargaining situations differ from the two-person bargaining problem characterized by Nash, and hence the employment of a probabilistic model is advocated in order to predict the bargainers' expected utility
Axiom · Axiom independence · Bargaining problem · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Independence (probability theory · Independence of irrelevant alternatives · Mathematical economics · Monotonic function · Normative · Operations management · Pareto principle · Point (geometry · Probabilistic logic · Social choice theory · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics
Success and failure in complex collective decision making
Solving the Bargaining Problem
Conflict and Order
Negotiation in International Politics
Modeling Compromise at the International Table
Individual rationality and bargaining
Testing Models of Pure Exchange
A Treasure Trove of Insights
Assessing Power in Spatial Bargaining
Advances In Experimental Social Psychology
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
Two-Person Cooperative Games
Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations
The Bargaining Problem
Games and Decisions
Inequity In Social Exchange
An Experimental Examination of Samson's Dilemma
Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher
Games and Decisions
An Experimental Analysis of Some Structural Determinants of Equitable and Inequitable Exchange Relations
Expectations, Evaluations and Equity
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 1990 - 2026 (37) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |