Concession Behavior in a Bargaining Game
A Laboratory Test of the Risk Dominance Principle
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283716 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barry Sopher (Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 117-137 |
| Publication date | 1994-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002794038001006 |
| OpenAlex | W2154246838 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 11 |
This article reports on an experiment concerned with a two-stage, two-person, simultaneous-demand bargaining game. The focus of analysis is on a prediction for concession behavior in the second-stage game provided by Harsanyi's “risk dominance” principle, which is at odds with the prediction provided by the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the second-stage game. The results of the experiment provide support for the risk dominance prediction, with concessions occurring according to the prediction in 78% of eligible cases, thus outperforming the mixed-strategy equilibrium as a predictor of concession behavior
Bargaining power · Dominance (genetics · Economics · Game theory · Logistic regression · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Odds · Outcome (game theory · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Psychological games and sequential rationality
The Bargaining Problem
Prediction of behavior in two-person games
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,08 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2003 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |