We Don’t Talk to Terrorists
On the Rhetoric and Practice of Secret Negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283775 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julie Browne (0000-0003-2712-3812, New York University), Eric S Dickson (0000-0001-6389-7589, New York University) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 379-407 |
| Publication date | 2010-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002709358825 |
| OpenAlex | W1999276257 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 12 |
Political actors sometimes make public commitments not to negotiate with adversaries whom they label as being beneath diplomacy. Such commitments are sometimes made even as they are being broken. Why do actors sometimes publicly denounce adversaries with whom they intend to negotiate? What effect does such prenegotiation rhetoric have on the prospects for successful negotiated settlements? In this paper, the authors present a novel game-theoretic model of conflict bargaining, in which actors can make public commitments not to negotiate before deciding whether to engage in secret negotiations with adversaries. The authors model such commitments as affecting actors’ audience costs; a denunciation increases an actor’s motivation to reach a negotiated settlement if negotiations are undertaken. Although such a decision weakens an actor’s bargaining power, in equilibrium actors sometimes publicly denounce their counterparts. The authors present and interpret equilibrium behavior in their model and discuss the implications of their results for future research
Denunciation · Diplomacy · Economics · Human settlement · Law and economics · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public relations · Rhetoric · Settlement (finance · Sociology · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
A New Local Turn for Track One Peace Process Research
The Political Economy of Terrorism
Talking with terrorists, talking with governments
Political Rhetoric as a Quasi-Symbolization
Uncertain Readiness
Concessions or Crackdown
Introduction to the special issue
The Servant of Many Masters
Democracy, civil liberties, and hostage-taking terrorism
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Responding to terrorism
Looking for Audience Costs
Honest Threats
Audience Costs and Interstate Crises
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations
Negotiating with terrorists
Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining
Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy
A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.45 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2023 (18) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |