Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6283888
AutoresAlexandre Debs (0000-0002-3114-490X, Yale University, autor correspondente), Jessica Chen Wei (0000-0001-9807-1402, Yale University)
Ano2016
Volume60
Fascículo3
Páginas403-433
Data de publicação2016-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002714542874
OpenAlexW3125116593
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas42
Referências citadas46

We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, however, exacerbates reputational incentives. Because governments can no longer hide behind unknown circumstances, voters can better discern the government’s type from its actions, strengthening the incentives to appear resolved. The model bridges the gap between audience costs and its critiques, showing how domestic audiences punish leaders for inappropriate policies rather than empty threats. At the same time, it highlights how the prospects for peace are worse if uncertainty about the circumstances is removed, suggesting that greater transparency does not always promote peaceful outcomes

Economics · Function (biology · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Law and economics · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Reputation · Transparency (behavior · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies