Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6283936
AutoresMelvin Guyer (Mental Health Research Institute University of Alberta), John R E Fox (0000-0003-3039-8024, University of Alberta), John Fox (0000-0002-1196-8012, Department of Sociology University of Alberta), Henry Hamburger (School of Social Sciences University of California (Irvine))
Ano1973
Volume17
Fascículo4
Páginas719-744
Data de publicação1973-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/002200277301700407
OpenAlexW2085443622
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas10

Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty trials

Dilemma · Game theory · Group (periodic table · Mathematical economics · Non-cooperative game · Normal-form game · Political science · Politics · Presentation (obstetrics · Prisoner's dilemma · Probabilistic logic · Repeated game · Representation (politics · Sequential game · Simultaneous game · Superrationality · Value (mathematics · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Mathematics · Medicine · Psychology · Social Psychology