Who Punishes Leaders for Lying About the Use of Force? Evaluating The Microfoundations of Domestic Deception Costs

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6284078
AutoresKeren Yarhi-Milo (0000-0002-5856-5173, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA, autor de correspondencia), David T Ribar (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA)
Año2023
Volumen67
Número4
Páginas559-586
Fecha de publicación2023-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027221118808
OpenAlexW4292018605
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas37

It is a common stereotype that leaders lie, but for all our beliefs about how normal it is for a president to lie to the public we know next to nothing about how voters might actually view this conduct. Drawing from literature in behavioral economics, we theorize that voters apply their attitudes towards interpersonal lies when judging leaders, with people who see lying as more socially acceptable being less willing to punish leaders for exhibiting this behavior. Using a novel vignette-style survey experiment, we find strong support for our theory: despite widespread willingness to punish leaders who lie, individuals high in Machiavellianism and Self-Monitoring are far less willing to punish presidents for lying than their low-type peers, and in some cases do not punish at all. Using robustness checks and causal mediation analysis, we confirm that views regarding the moral acceptability of lying drive responses to presidential deception

Big Five personality traits · Deception · Dishonesty · Interpersonal communication · Lying · Machiavellianism · Moderated mediation · Personality · Vignette · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology