Sanctions and Preventive War
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6284155 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Daniel Mccormack (0000-0002-3485-6427, University of Pennsylvania, autor de correspondencia), Henry Pascoe (0000-0001-5221-2134, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA) |
| Año | 2017 |
| Volumen | 61 |
| Número | 8 |
| Páginas | 1711-1739 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002715620471 |
| OpenAlex | W2341880704 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 20 |
| Referencias citadas | 39 |
In this article, we demonstrate that through their use as tools of military containment, sanctions play an unappreciated role in international politics. We show that sanctions can be used to smooth shifts in relative power that would otherwise lead to preventive war. After presenting a model of shifting relative power and sanctions, we discuss two cases in which sanctions were imposed to destroy an adversary’s military capability. We also explore the implications of this argument for the evaluation of sanctions’ effectiveness. Because sanctions may be deployed as a mechanism to lock in the status quo rather than revise it, the outcome of a sanctions episode must be compared to its counterfactual rather than the status quo ante. Our argument suggests that sanctions may be effectively deployed in response to expected adverse shifts in relative power; therefore observed outcomes disadvantageous to the sanctioning state are insufficient proof that sanctions have failed
Adversary · Argument (complex analysis · Business · Computer security · Counterfactual thinking · Economic sanctions · Economics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Public economics · Sanctions · Status quo · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Medicine · Psychology · Social Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
Tools of the weak? Economic sanctions, threat perception, and conflict escalation
How the possibility of a fight-back strategy affects the consequences of a sanctions regime
Investigating the evolution of the logic of industry-specific trade sanctions against Russia, 2022–2024
Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining
Reputation or interaction
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
Uncertainty in crisis bargaining with multiple policy options
Coalition Politics and War Termination
Shock and awe
The Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations
When Prospective Leader Turnover Promotes Peace
Curtailed ambition
When Capabilities Backfire
An Economic Theory of War
Containing Rogues
The Shadow of Deterrence
Do Different Coercive Strategies Help or Hurt Deterrence
Hassling
Constraining to deter
Explaining peace during long and rapid power shifts
Economic sanctions reconsidered
Turmoil and triumph
Military Threats
War and Change in World Politics
The War Ledger
Bankrupting the Enemy
Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy
Coercive or Corrosive
Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work
Making the economy scream
Iran and Iraq
The Gulf war
The Gulf War
Iran and Iraq
The Iran-Iraq War
Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science
Interstate Peacekeeping
A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage
How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration
Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Institutions and International Cooperation
Ending Economic Sanctions
Dealing with Tyranny
Fools Suffer Gladly
Intervention and Democracy
The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion
Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace
Rationalist explanations for war
War as a Commitment Problem
The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution
Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders
Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats
Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict
When Do Power Shifts Lead to War
On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions
The Continuation of History
| Obras citantes distintas | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2,5 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 20 |