International Peacekeeping Encourages Foreign Direct Investment

Subnational Evidence From Liberia’s Extractive Sector

Bibliographic Data

ID6284161
AuthorsPatrick Hunnicutt (0000-0002-2588-0783, Environmental Science and Policy, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume68
Issue9
Pages1856-1883
Publication date2024-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027231211801
OpenAlexW4388248532
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited61

Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to post-conflict countries is difficult. After conflict ends, governments struggle to perfectly enforce the institutions which otherwise shield investors from political instability. Reflecting this governance problem, this article presents a new explanation linking United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations to subnational allocations of FDI in post-conflict countries. I specifically argue that deployments of UN peacekeeping police credibly signal to foreign firms where future political instability is least likely to disrupt their operations. Data from Liberia’s extractive sector support my argument. Increasing the local deployment of UN police encourages foreign firms to establish new natural resource concessions, particularly in areas where the government’s capacity to uphold the rule of law is weak

Argument (complex analysis · Business · Corporate governance · Development economics · Economics · Foreign direct investment · Government (linguistics · International economics · International trade · Natural resource · Peacekeeping · Political economy · Political instability · Political science · Politics · Finance · International Business and FDI · International Development and Aid · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development

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