Controlling Access to Territory

Economic Interdependence, Transnational Terrorism, and Visa Policies

Bibliographic Data

ID6284193
AuthorsNazli Avdan (0000-0002-0984-6120, Department of Political Science, Kansas University, KS, USA, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume58
Issue4
Pages592-624
Publication date2014-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002713478795
OpenAlexW2331358056
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited55

Previous scholarship has largely failed to address the effect of economic interdependence on issue areas other than interstate conflict. This study seeks to redress this lacuna by focusing on states’ visa policies and examining the impact of trade and capital interdependence in the context of transnational terrorism. The article argues that economic ties affect visa policies through a reconfiguration of preferences and the opportunity costs of economic loss and by tempering the impact of terrorism. To support this claim, the study conducts statistical analysis using directed dyad data on the visa policies of 207 states and independent political units. The article shows that the impact of economic interdependence is contingent on whether states are directly targeted in attacks of terrorism or face indirect threats from global terror. The study finds that economic incentives overwhelm security concerns when threats are indirect but have relatively limited influence, given threats against a state’s own citizens or territory

Context (archaeology · Development economics · Economic growth · Economic interdependence · Economics · Incentive · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Redress · Scholarship · State (computer science · Terrorism · International Development and Aid · Migration and Labor Dynamics · Migration, Refugees, and Integration

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub