Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284513 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mark A Boyer (University of Connecticut, Storrs, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 700-727 |
| Publication date | 1989-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002789033004006 |
| OpenAlex | W2111021413 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 32 |
This article seeks to broaden the scope of analyses of security burden sharing within the Western alliance system beyond the narrow military approach taken by past work in the economic theory of alliances. In contrast to that work, which has shown that the Western allies have been persistently free riding on the military efforts of the United States, an illustrative model is presented that posits the existence of burden sharing across issue areas among the Western allies. The model yields significantly different conclusions regarding (1) the nature of alliance burden sharing, (2) the optimality of alliance security provision, and (3) the future of cooperation in the Western alliance system in the face of declining American hegemony. On a theoretical level, this article begins to formulate a new economic theory of alliances that focuses on “trade” in public goods and adheres closely to the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. I hypothesize that nations will specialize in the production of those alliance goods (economic, political, and military) for which they possess comparative advantages. This hypothesis is given preliminary support through an examination of allied expenditures on the military and foreign aid
Alliance · Economics · Hegemony · International trade · Neoclassical economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public good · Scope (computer science · Work (physics · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Engineering · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law
Economics of Alliances
An expanded investigation of alliance security free riding
Bilateral and multilateral foreign aid
Strategic Decision Making, Alliances, and the Chemical Weapons Convention
Between Interests and Norms
Southeast Asian prospects and realities
The effect of alliance membership on national defense burdens, 1953–88
Colluding victims
Explaining states’ burden-sharing behaviour within Nato
Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union
The myth of free-riding
The Theory of Collective Action and Nato Defense Burdens
Testing the Theory of Collective Action
The Economic Theory of Alliances
Multiple Goals or Deterrence
Explaining Wars of Choice
Asylum Cooperation among Asymmetric Countries
What price vigilance?
Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences
The Political Economy of International Relations
Impurity of Defense
Estimating demand for public goods
Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of Nato
Economists free ride, does anyone else?
After Hegemony
Index to International Public Opinion, 1978-1979
Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies
An Economic Theory of Alliances
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods by Groups III
Pricing public goods
Economic Problems of Alliance
A New Approach to Burden Sharing
US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Nato
A Reassessment
On the Economic Theory of Alliances
In Defense of a Collective Goods Theory of Alliances
Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy
Hierarchy versus inertial cooperation
Reflections on the economics and politics of international economic organizations
Collective Economic Security
An experimental investigation of the free-rider problem
| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,47 |
| Citation span | 1990 - 2024 (35) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |