In Defense of a Collective Goods Theory of Alliances
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284559 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tod Sandler (0000-0001-9077-5915, Department of Economics University of Wyoming Institute of Social and Economic Research University of York, York, England), Todd Sandler, Jon Cauley (Department of Economics University of Hawaii—Hilo), John F Forbes (Social Paediatric and Obstetric Research Unit University of Glasgow—Scotland), John Forbes (0000-0002-8255-3762, University of Glasgow) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 537-547 |
| Publication date | 1980-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200278002400308 |
| OpenAlex | W2047817254 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 14 |
This article defends the collective goods theory of alliances by showing that club theory is an appropriate tool for analyzing allocative issues of alliances from a positive prospective. The article concludes with a demonstration that Oppenheimer made an analytical mistake when he questioned the normative importance of Pareto optimality
Allocative efficiency · Club · Collective security · Economics · International relations · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Mistake · Normative · Operations management · Pareto principle · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Business Strategy and Innovation · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic theories and models · Law
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Estimating the Impact of the Soviet Union's Threat on the United States-- Japan Alliance
Who is keeping the peace and who is free-riding? Nato middle powers and Burden Sharing, 1995–2001
Who is free-riding in Nato’s peace operations in the 1990s
The likelihood of local allies free-riding
Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures in a Defense Alliance
Nato and the Persian Gulf
The Theory of Collective Action and Nato Defense Burdens
Research on Conflict Theory
Alliances and Collective Goods
Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System
Some Reflections on Clubs and Alliances
What price vigilance?
Impurity of Defense
Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of Nato
The Calculus of Consent
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure
An Economic Theory of Alliances
The Theory and Structures of International Political Economy
An Economic Theory of Clubs
A Reassessment
On the Economic Theory of Alliances
The Design of Supranational Structures
Can Nuclear Deterrence Last out the Century
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,26 |
| Citation span | 1980 - 2017 (38) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |