The Continent of International Law
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284541 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barbara Koremenos (University of Michigan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 653-681 |
| Publication date | 2013-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712448904 |
| OpenAlex | W2014967060 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 47 |
This article introduces the Continent of International Law (COIL) research project on international agreement design. COIL stems from the conviction that the International Organization subfield's focus on the couple hundred international organizations with physical headquarters had to be broadened to include the tens of thousands extant international agreements, that is, international law. Each piece of international law can and should be studied as an institution. Together, this set of institutions, which truly is a “continent,” is theoretically very interesting and empirically very diversified. COIL's basic theoretical premise is that international agreement design and comparison across agreements begins by understanding the underlying cooperation problem(s) the agreements are trying to solve. COIL identifies 12 distinct and recurrent cooperation problems, which may occur alone or in combinations. The data collection features a random sample of international agreements conditional on the issue areas of economics, environment, human rights, and security. The first large-n, systematic operationalization of the cooperation problems underlying real international agreements is highlighted, and descriptive statistics are presented – some of which challenge conventional wisdom. For instance, enforcement problems (Prisoner's Dilemma-like situations) are important, but far from universal, with 30% of the agreements characterized by that underlying problem. The numerous and diverse COIL variables allow for a multi-dimensional operationalization of the difficult-to-measure concept of the “incomplete contract.” Hypotheses from contract theory are tested, confirming the appropriateness of the new measure, the weakness of measures based on number of pages, and most significant, the rationality and efficiency of the continent of international law
Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · International law · International relations · Law and economics · Operationalization · Political science · Premise · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · International Arbitration and Investment Law · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
The Opening Up of International Organizations
The Continent of International Law
Splitting Climate Engineering Governance
Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Choice
Evading international law
The ethics of state consent to international law
Transnational Access to International Organizations 1950–2010
Deliberative institutional design and US defence and security agreements
Reconceptualising burdens – Nato centres of excellence
Rethinking Tests of the IO Effectiveness Hypothesis
The Political Legitimacy of Global Governance and the Proper Role of Civil Society Actors
After compliance in India and beyond
Analyzing Contracts
Issue linkage and international cooperation
Explaining incompleteness and conditionality in alliance agreements
Get Rid of Unanimity Rule
Manipulating Public Beliefs about Alliance Compliance
Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied and Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements
Can International Organisations Be Democratic? A Reassessment
Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations
Beyond Credible Commitments
Forum Isolation
Managing risks, side payments, and multi-institutional enlargement
Regional patterns of multilateral treaty cooperation
The performance of international organizations
The New Terrain of Global Governance
Exploring the Universe of UN Human Rights Agreements
Dyads Are Dead, Long Live Dyads! The Limits of Dyadic Designs in International Relations Research
Boilerplate in International Trade Agreements
Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements
Explaining the Transnational Design of International Organizations
A Function-Sensitive Approach to the Political Legitimacy of Global Governance
Analogy-based collective decision-making and incremental change in international organizations
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Optimal Imperfection?
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
After Hegemony
International Governance
Cooperation under Anarchy
Standing Your Ground
If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?
Mobilizing for Human Rights
Ego network betweenness
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Control the issues, control the conflict
Structural causes and regime consequences
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
Global Communications and National Power
Understanding factor analysis
Toward a theory of international politics
The strategy of conflict . Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory
Driving with the Rearview Mirror
Introduction
The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design
Coordination and collaboration
Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Rational Design
Interests, power, and multilateralism
Rationalist explanations for war
Regime design matters
Modeling the forms of international cooperation
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations, 1981–1992
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
The Consequences of Collective Action
The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985
Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
Contracting around International Uncertainty
Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,54 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 33 |