The Political Economy of Plunder

Economic Opportunity and Modern Piracy

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6284570
AutoresRyan Jablonski (0000-0002-7344-6738, University of California San Diego), Ryan S Jablonski (Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA), Steven Oliver (0000-0002-1637-7692, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA)
Año2013
Volumen57
Número4
Páginas682-708
Fecha de publicación2013-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002712448907
OpenAlexW2128417156
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas22
Referencias citadas42

Maritime piracy is a growing scourge on the international community—imposing large costs on maritime states and the shipping industry, as well as potentially undermining state capacity and funding terrorism. Using original data on over 3,000 pirate attacks, the authors argue that these attacks are, in part, a response to poor labor market opportunities. To establish this, the authors take advantage of the strong effect of commodity prices on labor market opportunities in piracy-prone states. Consistent with this theory, the authors show that changes in the price of labor- and capital-intensive commodities have consistent and strong effects on the number of pirate attacks in a country’s territorial waters each month. The authors confirm these results by instrumenting for commodity prices using monthly precipitation levels

Capital (architecture · Commodity · Commodity market · Economics · Economy · International economics · Market economy · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · Price shock · State (computer science · Terrorism · Finance · Global trade and economics · Law · Maritime Security and History · Political Conflict and Governance