Stochastic Collusion and the Power Law of Learning
A General Reinforcement Learning Model of Cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284716 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Flache (0000-0002-8276-8819, Department of Sociology University of Groningen, the Netherlands), Michael W Macy (0000-0003-0024-5027, Department of Sociology Cornell University) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 629-653 |
| Publication date | 2002-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200202236167 |
| OpenAlex | W2138420404 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 30 |
Concerns about models of cultural adaptation as analogs of genetic selection have led cognitive game theorists to explore learning-theoretic specifications. Two prominent examples, the Bush-Mosteller stochastic learning model and the Roth-Erev payoff-matching model, are aligned and integrated as special cases of a general reinforcement learning model. Both models predict stochastic collusion as a backward-looking solution to the problem of cooperation in social dilemmas based on a random walk into a self-reinforcing cooperative equilibrium. The integration uncovers hidden assumptions that constrain the generality of the theoretical derivations. Specifically, Roth and Erev assume a “power law of learning”—the curious but plausible tendency for learning to diminish with success and intensify with failure. Computer simulation is used to explore the effects on stochastic collusion in three social dilemma games. The analysis shows how the integration of alternative models can uncover underlying principles and lead to a more general theory
Collusion · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Generality · Management · Matching (statistics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Reinforcement learning · Social dilemma · Stochastic game · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics
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Applying the matching law as micro-foundation of social phenomena
The principles of psychology.
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Learning in extensive-form games
Social Dilemmas
Social behavior
The evolution of cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Pavlov and the Evolution of Cooperation
Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysis
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Walking out of Social Traps
Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism
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Anomalies
Learning to Cooperate
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,55 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |