Backgrounds With Benefits? Rebel Group Origins and Concessions During Civil Wars in Africa

Bibliographic Data

ID6284841
AuthorsJessica Maves Braithwaite (0000-0001-5738-3047, University of Arizona, corresponding author), Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (0000-0002-7495-5972, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA)
Year2024
Volume68
Issue9
Pages1691-1716
Publication date2024-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027231211792
OpenAlexW4388860771
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited58

Why do governments make concessions to some rebels but not others? We argue that the origins of rebel groups influence the bargaining process, and the government’s willingness to make concessions in particular. Rebel groups inherit different resource endowments – community ties and military expertise – from pre-existing “parent” organizations. These resource endowments are visible to the government, and they provide critical information about the likely durability of the rebellion. We expect that rebel group origins facilitating these endowments are associated with the state offering concessions earlier in the conflict. Employing original data on rebel group origins, as well as information on government concessions during post-Cold War African conflicts, we find general support for our expectations, although not all types of parent organizations are equally beneficial to rebel groups when it comes to extracting concessions from the state

Economics · Government (linguistics · Political economy · Political science · Resource (disambiguation · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · State (computer science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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