Democracy and War Effort

An Experiment

Bibliographic Data

ID6284944
AuthorsAndrew W Bausch (Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume61
Issue4
Pages814-838
Publication date2017-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002715590876
OpenAlexW744345554
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited59

This article uses a laboratory experiment to explore how groups’ internal rules for leader selection affect how leaders select into and fight conflicts. The findings reveal that, counter to expectations, leaders of democratic groups were more likely than leaders of autocratic groups to select into a conflict rather than accept a negotiated settlement. Conditional on conflict occurring, democratic leaders did not mobilize more resources for war than autocratic leaders. However, democratic leaders were less likely to accept a settlement once a war was underway and they expended more effort in the last round of conflict, suggesting once they entered a war they fought for a decisive victory. Domestically, democratic leaders were punished for losing wars more often than autocratic leaders, while winning wars did not benefit democratic leaders significantly

Autocracy · Democracy · Economics · Internal conflict · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Settlement (finance · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Victory · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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