Temptation and threat in non-zero-sum games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284980 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Worchel (Department of Psychology, University of Texas, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1969 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 103-109 |
| Publication date | 1969-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200276901300107 |
| OpenAlex | W2093118334 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
Rapoport (1962b) characterizes the twoperson non-zero-sum game as a tale of lust and betrayal. Each player is tempted to doublecross the other to obtain an immediate larger gain for himself, or to maximize his gain relative to the other, or to protect himself from the possible treachery of the other (Bixenstine and Wilson, 1963; Loomis, 1959; Minas et al., 1960; Scodel, 1962; Scodel et al., 1959). At the same time each is inhibited from defection by the fear of retaliation or possibly by guilt at doublecrossing a cooperative partner. Which force dominates in a game depends partly upon the characteristics of the payoff matrix. Rapoport (1962a) represented these characteristics by three parameters (see Figure 1): reward for cooperation (r), temptation for defection (tj), and punishment for defection (p), as shown here
Betrayal · Economics · Mathematical economics · Punishment (psychology · Stochastic game · Temptation · Zero (linguistics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,02 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 1983 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |