Transatlantic Shakedown
Presidential Shaming and Nato Burden Sharing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285032 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jordan Becker (0000-0001-7144-6403, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, NY, USA, corresponding author), Sarah E Krep (0000-0002-0924-4234, Cornell University), Sarah E Kreps (Cornell University), Paul Poast (0000-0001-8930-2758, University of Chicago), Rochelle Terman (0000-0003-1987-3613, University of Chicago) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 195-229 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027231167840 |
| OpenAlex | W4366605546 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 76 |
Does “shaming” work in NATO? More precisely, does publicly using negative language criticizing allies’ defense spending improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower spending? We evaluate the effectiveness of public shaming language; specifically, whether it increases allies’ defense spending or whether other considerations like external threat, domestic budgets, economic growth, or unemployment rates are better predictors of contributions. Using an original dataset of presidential statements and NATO defense spending data disaggregated across the four categories tracked by the alliance, we conclude that negative language toward allies’ spending is at best ineffective and may even adversely affect burden-sharing in the long run. These findings have important implications for the political economy of alliances and both theories and policies on the use of rhetorical pressure to elicit compliance in asymmetric power relationships
Affect (linguistics · Alliance · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public economics · Rhetorical question · Sociology · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Military and Defense Studies
Thankless Task
Alliance Under Pressure
US Diplomatic Visits and Allies’ Military Spending
The Politics of Alliance Cohesion
Pledge and Forget? Testing the Effects of Nato’s Wales Pledge on Defense Investment
Elite perceptions of the US’ commitment to Nato after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Beyond burden-sharing
Gunboats and butter
Setting targets
How Threats of American Withdrawal from Nato Affect European Public Attitudes Toward Defense
No exit
Foreign Policy as Compensation
Do Alliance Abandonment and Coercion Increase Support for Nuclear Weapons? An Elite Survey in Nato
Not listening to big brother
Do Threats or Shaming Increase Public Support for Policy Concessions? Alliance Coercion and Burden-Sharing in Nato
How Does Shaming Human Rights Violators Abroad Shape Attitudes at Home
The EU, Nato and the Integration of Europe
Coalitions of Convenience
The Database of Political Institutions 2017 (DPI2017)
Unit root tests for panel data
A 50-year review of psychological reactance theory
Política entre las naciones
The Politics of Leverage in International Relations
Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe
An Economic Theory of Alliances
The "Agonizing Reappraisal"
Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 Nato expansion
Ronald Reagan’s Strategies and Policies
Beyond Naming and Shaming
Managing the Nato Alliance
Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power
Do Allies Really Free Ride
Economic Problems of Alliance
Networks of Domination
Fears of peers? Explaining peer and public shaming in global governance
Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945
U.S. Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate
Theory of international politics
The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics
Mr. Strachey and World Order
Understanding Wordscores
Shaming and democracy
Representing Defense
Shaming and Blaming
Treating International Institutions as Social Environments
The Continent or the “Grand Large”? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in Nato
The Company You Keep
The Politics of Shame
J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?1
Institutional Assets and Adaptability
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Sticks and Stones
Diplomacy and domestic politics
Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations
The Illusion of Democratic Credibility
Chain gangs and passed bucks
Rusty guns and buttery soldiers
When Do Leaders Free‐Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense
Alliances and Asymmetry
Alliance Politics and Issue Areas
The Psychology of Coercion Failure
Taking Time Seriously
When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses
Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms
Accidental rivals? EU fiscal rules, Nato, and transatlantic burden-sharing
The party scene
The Political Economy of US Military Spending
Why Nato survived Trump
Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1934
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |