A Theory of the Balance of Power in International Systems

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6285095
AutoresEmerson M S Niou, Peter C Ordeshook (Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin)
Año1986
Volumen30
Número4
Páginas685-715
Fecha de publicación1986-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002786030004005
OpenAlexW2114111263
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas16

Attempts at incorporating the assumption that national leaders pursue clearly defined objectives, and at applying the theory of cooperative games to the analysis of international systems, have led to little success in formalizing the concept of balance of power, and in providing a theoretical justification for much of the scholarly intuition about this concept. But by assuming that such leaders temper their desire to maximize resources by the goal of ensuring the survival of their countries, and by distinguishing between two forms of stability—one in which no nation's existence is threatened and one in which no nation's resources are threatened—we offer a model that yields necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of stability. Our critical assumption is that before entering armed conflicts and before forming either offensive or defensive alliances, national leaders evaluate the future games that their current actions imply, and the consequences of participating in such games

Balance (ability · Economics · Epistemology · Intuition · Law and economics · Management · Offensive · Political science · Positive economics · Power (physics · Threatened species · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Psychology