Commitment to Future Interaction and Relative Power Under Conditions of Interdependence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285099 |
|---|---|
| Authors | E Allen Slusher (University of Missouri), Gerald L Rose (University of Iowa), Kenneth J Roering (University of Missouri) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 282-298 |
| Publication date | 1978-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277802200205 |
| OpenAlex | W2103455711 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
A 2 (committed or uncommitted) × 2 (high power or low power) × 3 (structure: Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken or No Conflict) factorial design was used to examine the effects of commitment to future interaction, relative power, and the structure of interdependence. The dependent variable was the proportion of cooperative choices on a series of single-play game matrices. Data were collected from 120 undergraduate students in a laboratory situation. The task consisted of responding either cooperatively or competitively to 18 game matrices. Each matrix was presented individually and without feedback concerning previous outcomes. As hypothesized, the results showed an interaction between commitment and power. Low reward power subjects were more cooperative when uncommitted than when committed in Chicken and the No Conflict game. High power subjects were more cooperative when committed than when uncommitted in the Prisoner's Dilemma. These results suggest caution when generalizing from the prevalent propositions that low power and commitment to future interaction have a cooperative effect
Dilemma · Economics · Power (physics · Prisoner's dilemma · Task (project management · Behavioral Health and Interventions · Cultural Differences and Values · Mathematics · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation
On Conflicts and Bargaining
Statistical principles in experimental design.
Dependence and Cooperation
Conflict, cooperation and trust in three power systems
Shifts of Power in a Mixed-Motive Game
Relationships with opponent and partner in mixed-motive bargaining
Prospects for experimental games
Games Played Once
The effect of electrical shock and warning on cooperation in a non-zero-sum game
Opponent's personality, expectation of social interaction, and interpersonal bargaining
Exploitative behavior in non-zero-sum games
Social power and the credibility of promises
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 1981 - 1987 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |