Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War

Bibliographic Data

ID6285196
AuthorsBarbara F Walter (0000-0002-2771-464X, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume59
Issue7
Pages1242-1272
Publication date2015-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002714528006
OpenAlexW2141702885
LanguageEN
Citations received111
References cited45

Most contemporary civil wars are now recurrences of earlier civil wars. In contrast to classic theories of grievance and opportunity, this article advances a theory of civil war recurrence that highlights the critical role political and legal institutions play in constraining elites in post–civil war states. Such constraints serve as a check on executive power, help incumbent elites credibly commit to political reform, and create a situation where rebels need not maintain militias as a supplementary mechanism to hold political elites in line. All of this reduces the odds of repeat civil war. Using a statistical analysis of post-conflict years, this article demonstrates that strong political institutions are not only significantly and negatively related to repeat civil war but are the primary determinants of whether countries get caught in the conflict trap

Civil society · Commit · Corporate governance · Economics · Grievance · Odds · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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