Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285598 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aseem Mahajan (0000-0002-2790-913X, Harvard University), Ronald Kline (0000-0003-1874-4975, Stony Brook University, corresponding author), Dustin Tingley (0000-0002-2216-6293, Harvard University) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 61-90 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027211027309 |
| OpenAlex | W3188772279 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 42 |
International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining
Bargaining power · Business · Climate change · Climate change mitigation · Collective bargaining · Economics · Equity (law · Exploit · Market economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Public economics · Vulnerability (computing · Agricultural risk and resilience · Climate Change and Geoengineering · Climate Change Policy and Economics
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Bargaining in Legislatures
Nonrepresentative Representatives
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |