Collective risk social dilemma and the consequences of the US withdrawal from international climate negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299243 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Oleg Smirnov (0000-0002-9633-910X, Stony Brook University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 660-676 |
| Publication date | 2019-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819875511 |
| OpenAlex | W2974173807 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
International climate negotiations represent an interesting theoretical problem, which can be analyzed as a collective risk social dilemma as well as an n-person bargaining model. The problem is made more complicated by politics due to the differences between: (1) total and per capita emissions; and (2) present-day and cumulative emissions. Here, we use a game theoretic approach in conjunction with the literature on effort-sharing approaches to study a model of climate negotiations based on empirical emissions data. We introduce a ‘fair equilibrium’ bargaining solution and examine the consequences of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Our results suggest that the collective goal can still be reached but that this requires additional greenhouse gas emissions cuts from other countries, notably, China and India. Given the history of climate negotiations, it is unclear if these countries will have sufficient political will to accept the additional costs created by the US defection
Climate change · Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Global warming · Greenhouse gas · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Per capita · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law
Climate Change 2013 – The Physical Science Basis
Equilibrium points in n -person games
Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
Inequality, communication, and the avoidance of disastrous climate change in a public goods game
The Bargaining Problem
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly
Passive non-participation versus strategic defection in a collective risk social dilemma
Provision of Step-Level Public Goods
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |