In the Eye of the Storm
Rebel Taxation of Artisanal Mines and Strategies of Violence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285924 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mario Krauser (0000-0002-5241-2280, University of Konstanz, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1968-1993 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002720916824 |
| OpenAlex | W3016859158 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 45 |
According to the resource curse theory, persistent violence in developing areas results from rebels’ ability to finance warfare with natural resource revenues. Surprisingly, this overlooks the complexities of raising revenue from a mobile mining population that values security as well as income. The literature thus neglects a fundamental question: what are the incentives of rebel groups to prevent or perpetuate conflict in mining areas? This paper delineates a rational to both increase and decrease violence. Protecting a mine should allow rebels to extract taxes in return. Simultaneously, to maintain this demand for security, rebels may need to destabilize the wider area. The hypotheses are tested with novel data on rebel taxation at over 3’000 artisanal mines in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Supporting the hypotheses, the results show that rebel-taxed mines appear exempt from violence nearby but imperiled at the perimeter
Curse · Democracy · Development economics · Economics · Incentive · International economics · Market economy · Natural resource · Political economy · Political science · Population · Resource (disambiguation · Resource curse · Revenue · Revenue sharing · Safe haven · Sociology · Finance · Law · Mining and Resource Management · Natural Resources and Economic Development · Political Conflict and Governance
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2027 (8) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |