Electoral Authoritarianism and Credible Signaling in International Crises
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6286144 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brandon J Kinne (0000-0002-4488-6662, School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA), Nikolay Marinov (0000-0002-1870-8248, Yale University) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 359-386 |
| Publication date | 2013-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712446124 |
| OpenAlex | W2095278503 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 41 |
How, if at all, do nondemocratic elections affect credible signaling in international crises? While the literature on credible signaling emphasizes the importance of electoral competition, it does not specify the minimal conditions that elections must satisfy in order to enhance the credibility of threats. We address this oversight by focusing on two fundamental properties of electoral institutions: (1) the degree of proincumbent bias and (2) the vulnerability of the incumbent to a de facto loss of power following an opposition victory. Our theory argues that both decreases in electoral bias and increases in incumbent vulnerability introduce greater accountability into the electoral process and thus enhance the credibility of public threats, even when elections fail to meet basic democratic standards. We apply these insights to the case of electoral authoritarianism, that is, regimes in which some form of electoral competition exists but basic principles of democratic governance are commonly violated. Using data on reciprocation rates in militarized crises, We show that, so long as electoral biases are sufficiently low and incumbent vulnerability is sufficiently high, even electoral authoritarian regimes are able to credibly signal resolve
Accountability · Authoritarianism · Competition (biology · Corporate governance · Credibility · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Good governance · Operationalization · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Victory · Vulnerability (computing · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
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Thirty Years of the Audience Cost Theory
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An Opportunity for Backing Down
Political Competition and the Initiation of International Conflict
Exogenous shock and Russian studies
Authoritarian Institutions and State Repression
Autocracies and International Cooperation
Observing incumbent abuses
Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development
The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism
Fraud, grievances, and post-election protests in competitive authoritarian regimes
War and Revenge
Parties and party systems
Voting for Autocracy
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Clarify
Democracy and Development
Electoral Authoritarianism
The Correlates of War (Cow) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0
The MID 3 data set, 1993–2001
Stuffing the Ballot Box
Competitive Authoritarianism
Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes
The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001
Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Classifying political regimes
Which Elections Can Be Lost
The End of the Transition Paradigm
Elections Without Democracy
Elections Without Democracy
Elections Without Democracy
The Rise of Election Monitoring
Looking for Audience Costs
The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs
Tau-b or Not Tau-b
Rationalist explanations for war
Autocratic Audience Costs
Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War
War as a Commitment Problem
Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War
Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes
Portents of Pluralism
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations
Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data
Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992
Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,23 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |