Under the Umbrella
Nuclear Crises, Extended Deterrence, and Public Opinion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6286152 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David M Allison (0000-0002-7689-6988, Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA), Stephen Herzog (0000-0002-6812-6780, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland, corresponding author), J Ko (0000-0001-5912-2828, Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1766-1796 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027221100254 |
| OpenAlex | W4281566278 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 45 |
How robust is public support for extended nuclear deterrence in patron and client states? Recent studies have improved scholarly understanding of US public opinion about nuclear weapon use against non-nuclear adversaries. Yet, there is limited knowledge of public attitudes regarding retaliation for nuclear strikes against US allies. We develop a theoretical typology of nuclear crises and investigate this phenomenon with a novel survey experiment ( n = 6,623). Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans viewed realistic emergency alert messages about a most-likely case for nuclear retaliation: a North Korean missile attack on a US ally protected by the nuclear umbrella. Support for nuclear retaliation is low in all three countries, with important cross-national differences. Favorability increases with North Korean nuclear first-use, but it remains limited nonetheless. Surprisingly, US “tripwire” troop casualties do not increase Americans’ demands for nuclear retaliation. These findings have important implications for the study of nuclear crises and practice of extended deterrence
Adversary · Business · Computer security · Deterrence theory · Economics · International trade · Law and economics · Nuclear energy policy · Nuclear ethics · Nuclear force · Nuclear power · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public opinion · Sociology · Typology · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Risk Perception and Management
Trilateral Relations in Northeast Asia
Public opinion on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons
The Tripwire Effect
Conditional Assistance
Public Support for Nuclear Proliferation
Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too”
External Threat and Nuclear Preferences
People’s Responses to Nuclear Weapons
Elite-public gaps in support for nuclear and chemical strikes
The “Commitment Trap” Revisited
Rethinking the Deterrence-Disarmament Dichotomy
Continuity and change in Yoon Suk Yeol’s positioning of South Korea as a strong, proactive, and global middle power
Muddied waters
Russian roulette revisited
Allies and partners
A poliheuristic analysis of South Korea’s responses towards North Korea’s missile tests
The lesser evil? Experimental evidence on the strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos”
Attention beyond the battlefield
South Korean Cost Sensitivity and Support for Nuclear Weapons
Another test of nuclear taboo
Japan’s Counterstrike Capability
Social desirability bias and public opinion on nuclear weaponization
Testing the Firebreak
Winning Hearts and Minds? How the United States Reassured During the Russo-Ukrainian War
American Public Opinion on US Responses to Russia's Nuclear Threats in Ukraine
From Moscow With a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Use of Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict With Nato
Atomic Arguments and Counter-Arguments
Under No Circumstances? What the Chinese Really Think about the Wartime Use of Nuclear Weapons
Credibility in Crises
Nuclear Shibboleths
Ukrainian public opinion and the path to peace with Russia
Public support for arms control in the third nuclear age
Imperfect Victims? Civilian Men, Vulnerability, and Policy Preferences
The Nuclear Taboo
Paying the Human Costs of War
Military Power
The choice for multilateralism
North Korean nuclear weapons, 2021
Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe
Still Taboo? Citizens’ Attitudes toward the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Soldiers, Pollsters, and International Crises
Alliance and Public Preference for Nuclear Forbearance
Forum
Durable institution under fire? The NPT confronts emerging multipolarity
Experimental evidence on determinants of support for nuclear use in response to threats of nuclear retaliation
On Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint
Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran
Disarming Arguments
After Nuclear First Use, What
America First and the Populist Impact on US Foreign Policy
Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Proliferation
I Am a Tariff Man
Antinormative Messaging, Group Cues, and the Nuclear Ban Treaty
Japanese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms
Comparing the Accuracy of RDD Telephone Surveys and Internet Surveys Conducted with Probability and Non-Probability Samples
Does Mode Matter For Modeling Political Choice? Evidence From the 2005 British Election Study
Breaking Bad? How Survey Experiments Prime Americans for War Crimes
Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula
The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence
Retributive Support for International Punishment and Torture
Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire
Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict
Not Just a War Theory
An Eye for an Eye
Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes
Deterrence and International Conflict
How the Public Defines Terrorism
Signaling Alliance Commitments
Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments
Trivial Tripwires
Casualties and Public Support for Military Conflict with North Korea
Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Atomic Aversion
Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |