The Case for Chinese Federalism

Bibliographic Data

ID6287577
AuthorsMichael C Davis (0000-0003-2293-5694, corresponding author)
Year1999
Volume10
Issue2
Pages124-137
Publication date1999-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of democracy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1045-5736 • E-ISSN: 1086-3214
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/jod.1999.0027
OpenAlexW2074908606
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited8

The Case for Chinese Federalism Michael C. Davis (bio) China presents many faces to the outside observer. The dramatic economic reform processes of recent years have contributed to its diversity. What is less understood overseas is that this diversification has been accompanied by a marked tension in the relationships between the Beijing government and its assertive peripheral and regional communities. Throughout this period, China has resisted fundamental political reform, clinging to an authoritarian and ostensibly unitary system that emphasizes maintaining central political control. This need for central control has important implications for the prospect of political liberalization and democratization in China. Beijing’s political intransigence notwithstanding, decentralization and rampant regionalism have accompanied economic liberalization. There is an even greater contrast between the authoritarian center in Beijing and the trend toward liberal democracy in the highly developed peripheral communities of Hong Kong and Taiwan. These developments have produced tremendous pressure on China to loosen the grip of its authoritarian government and to rationalize its territorial political structure. In view of the structural tensions China is encountering in dealing with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the mainland regions, a combination of federalism and confederalism would seem to offer a promising alternative path forward. (This path may eventually also help to resolve the status of areas in western China like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia that have been promised autonomy and share peripheral status with Hong Kong and Taiwan, but the special circumstances of these communities will not be addressed here.) [End Page 124] It is doubtful whether China’s unitary system can adequately address the political-reform issues on the horizon. The unitary system has sometimes been elevated to the level of a cultural myth. It holds that China has always had a unitary territorial system, which is culturally ingrained in the Chinese identity. This myth, however, appears to explain more about the historical imperatives of maintaining central control than it does about Chinese culture. In ancient times, much of what is now Chinese territory in Central Asia and elsewhere on the periphery was made up of tributary states or protectorates, where central control from the Chinese imperial capital was often minimal or nonexistent. Over several thousand years of war and conflict, these peripheral communities, as well as forces emerging from the Chinese heartland, would frequently compete with the regime at the center for control, often splitting China into competing kingdoms. Since these regimes all featured autocratic or authoritarian rule, the myth of a unitary state under strong central leadership emerged. According to this myth, a regime that relinquished strong central control would be perceived as weak and have its territory seized or its government toppled by its opponents. In the communist period, the unitary myth was reinforced by the Marxist-Leninist commitment to dictatorship and democratic centralism. In the 1980s and 1990s, the historical tradition of a unitary system has presented problems for advocates of political reform in China, as it is difficult to imagine such a high degree of central control in a large democratizing state. The heavy-handed tactics that Beijing has employed to maintain its unitary system have also presented problems for its foreign partners, who are continually admonished to stay out of the many areas that China classifies as its internal affairs. These concerns point to the merits of federalism (on the Chinese mainland) and confederalism (with peripheral communities) as a mechanism for addressing China’s territorial and political problems. In the present discussion, the term “confederalism” will be understood simply to signify a higher degree of subunit independence with a more enforceable status. Confederalism often reflects a coming together by agreement—as in the case of the European Union—and the subunits may even have substantial international status (in the European case, even state status) or the right to opt out. Federalism, on the other hand, will be understood to include a lesser degree of local autonomy and a stronger center with broader authority and more pervasive integrative institutions. In the United States, federalism evolved over time from a states-rights orientation to a substantial level of central power. In a federal system, the right to opt out may be excluded and the subunits may be allowed

Authoritarianism · Beijing · Central government · China · Democracy · Democratization · Development economics · Economics · Federalism · Liberalization · Local government · Mainland China · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Regionalism (politics · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Migration, Refugees, and Integration · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration

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