The burden of authorship
How Agenda-Setting and Electoral Rules Shape Legislative Behaviour
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6289166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Finke (0000-0002-9028-8188, Aarhus University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 604-623 |
| Publication date | 2016-04-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13501763.2015.1059468 |
| OpenAlex | W1723408751 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 25 |
I study the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour in theEuropean Parliament. The straightforward expectation would be that members ofparliament are more likely to support their own group’s amendments. But what if national party leaders reject their group’s proposal. In this situation party leaders have strong incentives to reinforce party discipline because otherwise they stand to lose credibility in future negotiations. Hence, authorship ties voting behaviour to the bargaining stage by means of credible commitment. Yet, the effect of agenda-setting on voting behaviour is moderated by electoral rules. I argue that this interaction between agenda rules and electoral rules has significant implicationsfor the political representation in the European Parliament.Analysing voting data from the Sixth European Parliament, I find that the effect of authorship depends on the electoral rules. Members from open list systems avoid conflict with their party leaders by defecting on other groups’ proposals. Members from closed list systems are more likely to defect on their own group’s proposals, thereby confronting the party leadership. My results have important implications for the discussion on the democratic nature of the European Parliament
Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Political science · Positive economics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
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Issue Competition without Electoral Incentives? A Study of Issue Emphasis in the European Parliament
Competing Principals and Non-Vote Decisions in the European Parliament
Party discipline and intraparty accountability
When politics prevails
Dimensions of input responsiveness in the EU
Nationale Parteien im Europäischen Parlament
Party Policy in Modern Democracies
Democratic Politics in the European Parliament
Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989–98
Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior
Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament
Why do European political groups call the roll
Agenda Control in the Israeli Knesset during Ariel Sharon's Second Government
Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002
Proposal stage coalition-building in the European Parliament
Procedural and party effects in European Parliament roll-call votes
Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament
Committee Representation in the European Parliament
Policy positioning in the European Parliament
Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak
Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior
Party unity in parliamentary democracies
Causes of Roll-Call Votes Supply
Party politics and the power to report
The Committee System
Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
The consequences of appearing divided
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,7 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |