MP Firefighting and the institutional logic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6291615 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hallbera West (0000-0003-0008-0234, University of the Faroe Islands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 337-356 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Legislative Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1357-2334 • E-ISSN: 1743-9337 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13572334.2020.1818927 |
| OpenAlex | W3087946686 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 30 |
In parliamentary systems, parliament ensures that the government governs well, and typically parliaments institutionally are empowered to hold the government accountable. This article focuses on MPs Firefighting response to audit Fire Alarms about the government maladministration. Institutions foster expectations and as parliamentarians, MPs are expected to support audit reports. Nevertheless, the strong role of political parties in parliamentary systems fosters partisan expectations and challenges ex-post control activity. MPs activate control institutions when it serves partisan interests. However, this article argues that rules and specific procedures strengthen the institutional 'non-party' mode and challenge the partisan logic in parliamentary control activity. The article tests this expectation by an investigation of MPs Firefighting reactive activity to audit Fire Alarms as part of the institutionalised control process related to the Faroese SAI institution and PAC. The results show that MPs in fact to a high degree display parliamentarian behaviour in the institutionalised audit control process
Audit · Business · Control (management · Economics · Firefighting · Government (linguistics · Institution · Management · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Public relations · Computer Science · E-Government and Public Services · Law · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Accounting
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| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |