Parliamentary Committees and Ex-post Oversight
Institutional Options and Design
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6311652 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hallbera West (0000-0003-0008-0234, Department of History and Social Sciences, University of Faroe Islands , 100 Tórshavn , Faroe Islands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 601-622 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-26 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Parliamentary Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-2290 • E-ISSN: 1460-2482 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pa/gsad015 |
| OpenAlex | W4385055345 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 26 |
Parliamentary oversight of executive power is a parliamentary system concern, considering weaker ex-post institutional oversight mechanisms and actor incentive challenges. Yet, institutional options are precondition for making parliamentary ex-post oversight work and this article investigates which type of options in fact exists within the vital committee system and how they are designed. The expectation is that ex-post oversight options depend on distributional power structures, being stronger for systems with traditions for minority compared to majority governments. For the design, the expectation is an institutional ‘efficient’ outcome in terms of ex-post oversight options being placed in a controlled central oversight committee, and that this applies regardless of government traditions. Empirically, focus is on the five most similar Nordic state parliamentary cases that vary in committee settings and in government traditions. For the investigation focus is on specific ex-post oversight options, the design of these options and overall de-facto use. The findings show a clear difference between the Scandinavian minority cases and the Icelandic and Finnish majority cases. For the design, most cases have ex-post oversight options designed for specific oversight committees, but where the Danish Folketing deviates by providing several options in different committees
Political science · Law · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Committees
Parliaments and Coalitions
The Handbook of National Legislatures
Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation
Veto Players
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The Institutional Power of Western European Parliaments
Measuring Legislative Power
Developing an index of EX-Post parliamentary oversight of public finance
Members of parliament and governments in western Europe
Committee strength in parliamentary democracies
Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game
MP Firefighting and the Partisan Logic
Bringing Parties Into Parliament
Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Party unity in parliamentary democracies
People's Voice or Information Pool? The Role of, and Reasons for, Parliamentary Questions in the Swiss Parliament
MP Firefighting and the institutional logic
European integration and national parliamentary oversight institutions
Political parties in parliamentary democracies
Electoral competition and the oversight game
Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |