Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Social choice and comparing legislatures

Constitutional versus institutional constraints

Bibliographic Data

ID6291992
AuthorsAnthony J Mcgann (0000-0003-3297-1752, University of California, Irvine, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume12
Issue3-4
Pages443-461
Publication date2006-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Legislative Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1357-2334 • E-ISSN: 1743-9337
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13572330600877510
OpenAlexW1993551433
LanguageEN
Citations received15

There are two 'institutionalist' literatures that seek to explain legislative behaviour. Firstly, there is the macro 'Patterns of Democracy' literature that explains outcomes in terms of constitutional constraints. Secondly, there is a micro 'industrial organisation of legislatures' literature that explains outcomes in terms of internal legislative rules. I will argue that constitutional rules are powerful constraints on outcomes that can be bargained, while internal rules are endogenous. Neither of these literatures deals with the question of which legislatures are 'strong' in the law-making sense. This question, indeed, is misframed, as it makes little sense to treat a legislature as a unitary agent. In particular the common belief that the US Congress is a strong law-making legislature is mistaken

Democracy · Economics · Law and economics · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Unitary state · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies

  • El estudio de la deliberación en los Parlamentos

    Open Access•Carlos Rico Motos•Revista de Estudios Políticos•2017

  • Deliberation in parliaments

    Open Access•Carlos Rico Motos•Revista de Sociologia e Política•2019

  • Coalition government, frustrated majorities, and minority rule

    Open Access•David M Willumsen, Simon Otje•Party Politics•2024

  • Legislatures and Policy Uncertainty

    Open Access•Radoslaw Zubek, Christian Stecker•Journal of Public Policy•2010

  • Performing to Type? How State Institutions Matter in East Central Europe

    Open Access•Radoslaw Zubek, Klaus H Goetz•Journal of Public Policy•2010

  • Negative Agenda Control and Executive–Legislative Relations in East Central Europe, 1997–2008

    Radoslaw Zubek•Journal of Legislative Studies•2011

  • Consensus by Default? Interaction of Government and Opposition Parties in the Committees of the German Bundestag

    Bernhard Miller, Christian Stecker•German Politics•2008

  • Debunking the Myths of Bill Committees in the British House of Commons

    Open Access•Louise Thompson•Politics•2016

  • Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability

    Open Access•Michael Koß•Political Studies Review•2020

  • Is the ‘Constitution of Equality’ Parliamentary, Presidential or Hybrid

    Open Access•Steffen Ganghof•Political Studies•2015

  • Does the Executive Dominate the Westminster Legislative Process

    Meg Russell, Daniel Gover et al.•Parliamentary Affairs•2016

  • Pre-Appointment Scrutiny Hearings in the British House of Commons

    Robert Hazell, Mark Chalmers et al.•Journal of Legislative Studies•2012

  • Researching Ritual and the Symbolic in Parliaments

    Georgina Waylen•Journal of Legislative Studies•2010

  • Bills from the Floor

    Thomas Däubler•Journal of Legislative Studies•2011

  • Actors, Motivations and Outcomes in the Legislative Process

    Open Access•Meg Russell, Daniel Gover et al.•Government and Opposition•2017

Unique citing works15
Citations per year0,83
Citation span2008 - 2024 (17)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 15

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae