Performance Management by Culture in the National Labor Relations Board's Division of Judges and the German Labor Courts of Appeal

Bibliographic Data

ID6294791
AuthorsMartin Schneider (0000-0002-6961-3716, Labour Institute for Economic Research, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume14
Issue1
Pages19-32
Publication date2004-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jopart/muh002
OpenAlexW2031779125
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited5

Professional judges receive a fixed salary and are largely exempt from effective sanctions. How can management induce judges to perform well in their professional roles? Judges share work-related norms and values, derive status from their standing within the professional community, and are susceptible to peer review. Therefore, performance management may be perceived as maintaining and directing organizational culture, as is illustrated empirically in a case study covering the Division of Judges of the U.S. National Labor Relations Board and the German Labor Courts of Appeal. In both judiciaries, administrative tasks such as personnel selection are delegated to peers, candidates with known norms and values are recruited, and quantitative benchmarking appeals to judges' norms and values. The model of performance management by culture can explain all of these practices, whereas traditional models—relying solely on professional ethics or exerting tight bureaucratic control—fail to do so

Appeal · Bureaucracy · Division of labour · German · Labor relations · Organizational culture · Political science · Public relations · Salary · Sanctions · Sociology · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Law

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