Towards a Strategic View on EMU

A Critical Survey

Bibliographic Data

ID6296362
AuthorsBernhard Winkler (European University Institute, corresponding author)
Year1996
Volume16
Issue1
Pages1-28
Publication date1996-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0143-814X • E-ISSN: 1469-7815
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0143814x00007844
OpenAlexW2061594327
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited31

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate over European Monetary Union (EMU), reviewing the economics literature on the merits of a single currency (‘optimum currency area’) and on the requirements for astable currency (‘credibility’). To understand Europe's drive for EMU and the transition strategy adopted at Maastricht both issues must be analysed together. The controversial convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, in particular, primarily address valid concerns about the (price) stability performance of a future single currency by determining the timing and membership of EMU. In general, we propose to interpret the Maastricht design as a mechanism that must reconcile conflicting interests, solve credibility problems over time and extract information about candidate countries’ ‘stability culture’ in the run-up to monetary union

Convergence (economics · Credibility · Currency · Economic and monetary union · Economics · European integration · European monetary union · European union · International economics · Maastricht Treaty · Macroeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Optimum currency area · Political science · Price of stability · Single currency · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact

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