Nomenklatura Rule Under Democracy

Solving the Italian Political Puzzle

Bibliographic Data

ID6297475
AuthorsMario Ferrero (0000-0001-6801-4108), Giorgio Brosio (0000-0002-4317-6837)
Year1997
Volume9
Issue4
Pages445-475
Publication date1997-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951692897009004002
OpenAlexW1964134699
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited12

This paper attempts to explain the puzzling features of the Italian political system up to 1992 by means of an economic model of a democratic Nomenklatura, in which the normal operation of a democratic system is distorted by the self-perpetuation of a ruling elite - `Nomenklatura' - which co-opts members of the opposition into its ranks to secure re-election and maximize per capita rent from political office. Competition for the field is thus suppressed and competition within the field enhanced. The Nomenklatura regime arose as a response to a non-democratic opposition and could not survive the downfall of Communism in the early 1990s. Thus the model yields an explanation for the regime's collapse after 1992

Biology · Communism · Competition (biology · Democracy · Economics · Elite · Opposition (politics · Per capita · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Population · Sociology · Demography · Economic Policies and Impacts · Economic Theory and Institutions · Italy: Economic History and Contemporary Issues · Law

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