Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Why does the majority party bother to have minority party members on committees

Bibliographic Data

ID6298564
AuthorsHong Min Park (University of Alabama, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume24
Issue2
Pages248-264
Publication date2012-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629811429049
OpenAlexW1987258144
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited8

Why would a generic parliament have committees with minority party members? If the majority party considers minority party committee members a burden, then it could choose to exclude minority party members entirely from the committee system. This, however, has rarely happened in history. In this paper, I provide an informational rationale for the bipartisan committee system through a simple signaling model. I show that, in equilibrium, the majority party on the floor can extract better information and, therefore, enact more preferred policy outcomes by forming committees with members of both parties

Democracy · Parliament · Party platform · Political science · Politics · Single non-transferable vote · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Public Administration

  • The Strategic Value of Compromise

    Open Access•Michael Bednarczuk•Political Research Quarterly•2026

  • Bringing the minority back to the party

    Open Access•Adam J Ramey, Adam Ramey•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2015

  • A Question of Respect

    Open Access•Genevieve Fuji Johnson, Mary Burns et al.•Canadian Journal of Political…•2017

  • Majority Party, Standing Committees, and Evidence for Indirect Control

    Hong Min Park•Congress & the Presidency•2020

  • Committees in Congress

    Christopher J Deering, Christopher Deering et al.•Committees in Congress•1997

  • Information and Legislative Organization

    Keith Krehbiel•Information and Legislative…•1991

  • The Theory of Incentives

    Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean‐jacques Laffont et al.•Theory of Incentives•2002

  • Strategic Information Transmission

    Vincent P Crawford, Jeremy Sobel et al.•Econometrica•1982

  • The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

    Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin•Econometrica•1986

  • Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous

    Thomas W Gilligan, Keith Krehbiel•American Journal of Political…•1989

  • Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules

    Open Access•Vijay Krishna•American Political Science Review•2001

Unique citing works4
Citations per year0,36
Citation span2015 - 2026 (12)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 4

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae