Are group sources always credible? An experimental study of sources, stakes and participation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298739 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christy Aroopala (Yale University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 87-110 |
| Publication date | 2011-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629810382806 |
| OpenAlex | W2003027361 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 53 |
When is mobilization of group identity successful? Work on social movements suggests that frames that target group identity can mobilize groups. However, this work does not address when group mobilization using frames is likely to be successful. Recent work on source credibility finds that same-group sources are an important moderator of framing effects, and previous work on stakes of the decision shows that individuals in high stakes are more likely to participate than those in low stakes. I combine these two moderators of frames to generate predictions for when group sources are most likely to be credible. I test these predictions in the context of a public goods game laboratory experiment in which targeted frames are given to group members by sources that share their group identity and in which stakes of the decision are varied. The findings of this project have implications for political mobilization and campaigning based on group identities
Collective identity · Context (archaeology · Credibility · Economics · Framing (construction · Group (periodic table · Microeconomics · Mobilization · Moderation · Political science · Politics · Public good · Public goods game · Public relations · Social group · Social identity theory · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
Voting Hopes or Fears?
The Paradox of Representation
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective
Public Goods
Ethnocentrism, Social Identification, and Discrimination
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision
Learning from Neighbours
Attitudes and beliefs about affirmative action
Giving According to Garp
Is Anyone Responsible?
A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments
Introduction
The Logic of Collective Action
Race, Redistricting, and Representation
A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Public Good and Resource Good Settings
The free rider problem
Divergent evidence on free riding
Social identity theory
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem
Playing a Different Race Card
Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion
On Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages
The Value of Biased Information
A New Partisan Voter
On the Limits of Framing Effects
Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections
When Self‐Interest Matters
The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence
Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games
The Centrality of Race in American Politics
When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates
Another Look at the Life Cycle and Political Participation
Candidate Perception in an Ambiguous World
Black Candidates, White Voters
Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes
Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending
Choice behavior in social dilemmas
Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma
Intergroup competition for public goods
Framing Theory
White Reactions to Black Candidates
Linking Mobilization Frames and Political Opportunities
When Can Mediators Build Trust
Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies
Framing Processes and Social Movements
Social Dilemmas
| Citations per year | 0.14 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2012 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |