Foundations of Legislative Organization and Committee Influence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jaehoon Kim (0000-0002-0005-4506, Korea Development Institute in its Department of Industrial and Corporate Affairs), Lawrence S Rothenberg (0000-0003-2788-5585, University of Rochester) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 339-374 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629808090139 |
| OpenAlex | W2004101053 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 26 |
We revisit seemingly settled questions of legislative organization, specifying a more general, realistic, informational model than previously. While theorists, unlike empiricists, have commonly inferred that the floor lacks incentive to allow committee influence via gatekeeping, we find otherwise. By assuming that (1) legislators know more about the status quo than alternative proposals, and (2) committee authority is endogenously determined, we show for numerous realizations of floor-committee preference divergence that vesting committees with agenda-setting power under an open rule is preferred to either an open rule without agenda setting or a closed rule. Net of a closed rule, when committees can receive status quo payoffs from inaction, their sending a message, particularly with monopoly agenda setting, frequently transmits more information than under a pure open rule. As such, many situations exist where the floor will not want to use majoritarian mechanisms, such as discharge petitions or non-germane amendment authority, even if the committee chooses inaction. Although for different reasons than postulated by distributive theorists, gatekeeping and related features such as deference norms are sustainable equilibrium phenomena
Deference · Distributive property · Economics · Gatekeeping · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Opportunism · Political science · Status quo · Vesting · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
The American Congress
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Setting the Agenda
Delegating Powers
Strategic Information Transmission
Pivotal Politics
An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Catastrophic Politics
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Gatekeeping
House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Landmarks in Thestudy Ofcongress Since1945
Legislative Organization with Informational Committees
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Legislative Organization
Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2015 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |