House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301427 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barbara Sinclair (0000-0002-7580-1940, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 477 |
| Publication date | 1994-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.2307/440169 |
| OpenAlex | W2324649468 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 7 |
The institutional design debate at the heart of much recent theoretical controversy in legislative scholarship revolves around two questions: what is the core problem members of the legislature are attempting to solve in their choice of institutional arrangements? what is the key institutional mechanism through which the problem is tackled? This analysis of special rules in the House aims to contribute to that debate directly and indirectly. I test the predictions that the principal theories make about rule choice and find the party model to be most successful in accounting for contemporary rule choice on major legislation. I then argue that my data and analysis suggest three desiderata for an adequate theory. First, it must incorporate party as a key mechanism, as the importance of party and party leadership in the contemporary House suggests. Second, the theory must be dynamic, as the change in the centrality of party leadership over time suggests; members' answer to the core question-if not the question itselfmay change over time. Third, the theory needs to posit multiple goals, as a detailed look at the design of some rules suggests
Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Legal and Constitutional Studies
Party Influence in Congress
A delegação aos líderes partidários na Câmara dos Deputados e no Senado Federal
Agenda Control, Majority Party Power, and the House Committee on Rules, 1937–52
Party Messaging in the U.S. House of Representatives
The Development of Special Orders and Special Rules in the U.S. House, 1881–1937
Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st−108th Congresses
The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee
The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics
The Evolution of Legislative Jurisdictions
Punctuating the Congressional Agenda
Party Differentiation in Congress
Party Effects in State Legislative Committees
Balancing Power
Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting
The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias
Bicameralism and Minority‐Party Influence on Legislative Development
Foundations of Legislative Organization and Committee Influence
The role of procedural commitment in informational theories of legislative organization
Landmarks in Thestudy Ofcongress Since1945
Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship
Strategic Party Government
Restrictive Rules Reconsidered
Defining Debates from the Outside Looking In
Parties and Procedural Choice in the House Rules Committee
Rule Assignment in the Postreform House
Legislative Organization
Institutional Change in the House of Representatives, 1867-1998
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules
Bargaining in Legislatures
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Information and Legislative Organization
The logic of delegation
The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives
Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives
Institutional Context and Leadership Style
| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,03 |
| Citation span | 1997 - 2021 (25) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |