The Development of Special Orders and Special Rules in the U.S. House, 1881–1937
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7329601 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jason M Roberts (0000-0001-8113-1827, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 307-336 |
| Publication date | 2010-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298010792069161 |
| OpenAlex | W2153172979 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 24 |
The modern Committee on Rules plays a critical role in structuring the agenda of the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact, resolutions from the Committee on Rules are the primary means through which controversial legislation reaches the House floor. But the Committee on Rules did not play a role in shaping the floor agenda until the 1880s and, despite intense scrutiny of episodes such as the institution of the Reed rules and the revolt against Speaker Cannon, our understanding of the role of the Committee on Rules is limited and skewed heavily toward the post‐World War II era. This limitation is unfortunate, because special rules play a starring role in major theories of legislative organization. In this article, I present analysis of the usage and historical development of special rules in the House, and I offer findings from my empirical analysis of the determinants of rule choice from 1881 to 1937. A nuanced interrogation of new data on special rules in this era reveals support for committee specialization and conditional party government as motives for rule choice in this era
Government (linguistics · Home rule · House of Representatives · Institution · Interrogation · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Scrutiny · Sociology · Structuring · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Public Administration
Lawmaking
The Strategic Value of Compromise
Short-Term Goals and Long-Term Effects
Viva Voce
The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias
Partisan Efficiency in an Open-Rule Setting
Multiple Ideal Points
Majority Party Strategy and Suspension of the Rules in the House
The role of procedural commitment in informational theories of legislative organization
Parties and Procedural Choice in the House Rules Committee
Regulating the Floor
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Setting the Agenda
Information and Legislative Organization
Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew
Minority Rights, Majority Rule
Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000
History and Procedure of the House of Representatives
Disjointed Pluralism
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
Agenda Control, Majority Party Power, and the House Committee on Rules, 1937–52
Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules
Partisanship and Procedural Choice
House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy
Parties and Committees in the House
Suspension of the Rules, the Order of Business, and the Development of Congressional Procedure
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
"Rejoinder to "Sense and Sensibility
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Sense and Sensibility
Institutional Context and Leadership Style
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,73 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2026 (16) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |