Nominations for Sale
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299201 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Silvia Console-Battilana (Stanford University), Kenneth A Shepsle (Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 413-449 |
| Publication date | 2009-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629809339832 |
| PMID | 20011612 |
| PMCID | PMC2790216 |
| OpenAlex | W2134751000 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 20 |
Models of nomination politics in the USA often find ‘gridlock’ in equilibrium because of the supermajority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful. In the present article we explore the possibility that senators can be induced to vote contrary to their nominal (gridlock-producing) preferences through contributions from the president and/or lobbyists, thus breaking the gridlock and confirming the nominee. We model contributions by the president and lobbyists according to whether payment schedules are conditioned on the entire voting profile, the vote of a senator, or the outcome. We analyze several extensions to our baseline approach, including the possibility that lobbyists may find it more productive to offer inducements to the president in order to affect his proposal behavior, rather than trying to induce senators to vote for or against a given nominee
Business · Economics · Law and economics · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Political Game Theory
Pivots
Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
On Buying Legislatures
An economic theory of democracy
Pivotal Politics
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Vote Buying
Stability in Competition
Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate
Supreme Court Appointments as a Move‐the‐Median Game
Lobbying for Justice
Bribing Voters
A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting
Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions
Buying Supermajorities
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |