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Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Bibliographic Data

ID6299258
AuthorsHelmut Bester (Freie Universität Berlin, corresponding author), Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, Free University of Berlin and Market Processes and Governance Unit at the WZB (Social Science Research Center Berlin), corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume17
Issue2
Pages199-215
Publication date2005-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629805050860
OpenAlexW3125907109
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited29

Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target

CONTEST · Economics · International conflict · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law

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Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,17
Citation span2008 - 2023 (16)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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