Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi-Chamber Legislation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299449 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas König (0000-0002-1797-6662), Thomas Bräuninger (0000-0003-2767-717X) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 331-360 |
| Publication date | 1996-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951692896008003002 |
| OpenAlex | W2061682786 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 22 |
Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determined either by an inter-institutional or an internal coalition problem of all inter-linked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and different types of actors. Since collective actors such as parliaments or parliamentary chambers may not act as unitary actors, we examine the power distribution in both types of multi-chamber legislation by a game-theoretical method with regard to institutional settings and specific legislative schemes. We argue that the Shapley index is the most appropriate method for the comparative analysis of multi-chamber power. Our `parallel' research strategy is, thus, based on individual and corporate Shapley power shares which are subsequently added to collective chamber power. Our comparison of American and German legislation starts with an analysis of two-chamber parliamentary bargaining. Whereas this application corresponds to the bicameral parliamentary decision stage of conciliation and amending, our second application of Policy Leadership studies the checks-and-balances of all executive and legislative chamber actors. A third application is related to the situation of unified and divided government, and here we examine the power effects of institutional settings and party-oriented strategies in both types of multi-chamber legislation. In Germany, unified government excludes opposition actors, whereas American unified and divided government refers to the president's role in multi-chamber legislation
Arbitration · Conciliation · Economics · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Separation of powers · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
Comparing Policy Networks
Game Theory and Political Theory
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset
Power, voting, and voting power
Homogeneity, independence, and power indices
National Sovereignty and National Power in European Institutions
The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter
Factions in Committees
The Fallacy of Absolute Majority Rule
Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior
Needed
Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 1997 - 2001 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |