Estimating the Effect of Nonseparable Preferences in Eu Treaty Negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299607 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Finke (0000-0002-9028-8188, University of Heidelberg, , Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 543-569 |
| Publication date | 2009-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629809339803 |
| OpenAlex | W2016281493 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 39 |
This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states’ positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states’ positions at the IGC 2003—4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators
Econometrics · Economics · Estimator · European union · Ideal (ethics · Ideal point · International trade · Mathematical economics · Member states · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Order (exchange · Point (geometry · Political science · Preference · Statistics · Treaty · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Global trade and economics · Law · Mathematics
Using SAS PROC MCMC for Item Response Theory Models
Who are the non-separable voters
The merits of adding complexity
Vote Choice and the Nonseparability of Economic and Social Issues
Non-Separable Preferences in the Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Votes
Multidimensional Spatial Voting with Non-separable Preferences
How are the powers of the president decided? Vote trading in the making of Taiwan’s semi-presidential constitution
Modern Multidimensional Scaling
Ordinal Data Modeling
The European Union Decides
Mapping Policy Preferences ii
Analytical Politics
Explanatory Item Response Models
Democratic Politics in the European Parliament
Advances in the spatial theory of voting
The Calculus of Consent
Patterns of Democracy
Deciding the Future of the European Union
What does the European Union do
Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable Is Based on Estimates
The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules
A Note on Matthias Sutter
On the Dimensionality of European Union Legislative Decision-Making
Measuring and Analysing Positions on European Constitution-building
Analysing Roll Calls of the European Parliament
Bargaining Success in the European Union
Actor alignments in European Union decision making
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses
The Contested Council
Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation
Parties in the Council
The Treaty Reform of the EU
When and Why the EU Council of Ministers Votes Explicitly
The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force
Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy
The new politics of voting alignments in the United Nations General Assembly
Why Unanimity in the Council
Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors’ Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations
Analyzing Roll Calls with Perfect Spatial Voting
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,54 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2023 (11) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |