Structural Reform Litigation
Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 6299798 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Anthony M Bertelli (0000-0002-0756-5691, University of Georgia, autor de correspondencia), Sven E Feldmann (0000-0003-2812-2117, Northwestern University) |
| Año | 2006 |
| Volumen | 18 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 159-183 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2006-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629806061859 |
| OpenAlex | W3122800110 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 28 |
Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Business · Economics · Interest group · Law and economics · Legislature · Mandate · Negotiation · Plaintiff · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Statutory law · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Congress, keystone of the Washington establishment
Delegating Powers
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation
Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion
Two-Person Cooperative Games
Bureaucrats and Politicians
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Bureaucracy, Monopoly, and Competition
The Legislative Design of Judicial Review
Information and Judicial Review
Strategy and Accountability
Simple Justice
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Bargaining and Markets
The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information
Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,19 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2010 - 2017 (8) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |