An alternative mechanism through which economic inequality facilitates collective action
Wealth disparities as a sign of cooperativeness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299825 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tim Johnson (0000-0003-3014-9722, Willamette University), Oleg Smirnov (0000-0002-9633-910X, Stony Brook University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 461-484 |
| Publication date | 2012-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629812448236 |
| OpenAlex | W2104093213 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 38 |
Past models treat economic inequality as an exogenous condition that can provide individuals a dominant incentive to produce collective goods unilaterally. Here we part with that tradition so as to treat economic inequality and collective action as endogenous, and to examine whether economic inequality can foster collective action even when all individuals can gain from free-riding. Using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations, we study whether cooperation can evolve when agents play multiple, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games per generation and employ strategies that condition cooperative play on their game partners’ wealth holdings. In this game environment, we find that collective action succeeds via a strategy in which players choose to cooperate when joining a PD with an economic equal and defect when partnered with a player possessing wealth holdings unequal to their own. These results signal an alternative avenue through which economic inequality can influence the viability of collective action
Action (physics · Collective action · Cooperativeness · Dilemma · Economic inequality · Economics · Game theory · Incentive · Inequality · Microeconomics · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Public economics · Public good · Public goods game · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Egalitarian motives in humans
The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income
Bowling alone
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Governing the Commons
Nationalisation, Privatisation and the dilemmas of common property management in Western Rajasthan
A Theory of the Critical Mass
Collective Action
Evolutionary Dynamics
The Logic of Collective Action
Participation in Heterogeneous Communities
The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management
Pay Equality and Industrial Politics
Giving with Impure Altruism
A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action
Separating Trust from Cooperation in a Dynamic Relationship
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
On the private provision of public goods
Ending Footbinding and Infibulation
The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action
Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
Social Networks and Collective Action
| Citations per year | 0.21 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2016 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |