Dimensions of Legislative Conflict
Coalitions, Obstructionism, and Lawmaking in Multiparty Presidential Regimes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300567 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Taeko Hiroi (0000-0003-0751-9342, The University of Texas at El Paso), Lúcio R Rennó (0000-0002-0750-0943, Universidade de Brasília), Lucio Renno (Universidade de Brasília) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 357-386 |
| Publication date | 2014-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12049 |
| OpenAlex | W1506387053 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 36 |
This article addresses central issues in multiparty presidential systems: the functioning of legislative coalitions and the dynamics of legislative conflict. Since electoral competition has elements of both positive‐sum (increase in common support) and zero‐sum (exact division of the support) qualities, lawmaking in coalitional systems presents unique challenges. Using legislative data fromBrazil, we examine how coalition management and unity affect legislative delay and obstructionism. We find, among others, that: (1) coalition management is pivotal for both faster legislative approval and less obstructionism, but its effect depends on coalition size; and (2) cohesive opposition impedes the legislative process
Economics · Law and economics · Lawmaking · Legislative process · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |