Rewarding Dysfunction
Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300675 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeremy Gelman (0000-0002-1977-7130, University of Nevada, Reno, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 661-692 |
| Publication date | 2017-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12173 |
| OpenAlex | W2619303517 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 26 |
Why do majority parties choose to add extreme dead on arrival bills to their legislative agendas rather than enactable legislation? Majorities in Congress choose this strategy in order to accrue political support from their allied interest groups who reliably reward this legislative behavior. By examining all bills that receive floor consideration from 2003 through 2012, as well as interest group scorecards and campaign commercials, I find support for my theory. Dead‐on‐arrival bills generate electoral benefits for majority‐party lawmakers, are more politically valuable than other bills, and are more often used to credit rather than punish legislators
Economics · Interest group · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Special Interest Group · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Finance
Pivots or Partisans? Proposal-Making Strategy and Status Quo Selection in Congress
The symbolic uses of platforms
The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster
Do Lawmakers Respond to Crisis Ideologically or Pragmatically
Interest Groups and Intra‐Party Conflict on Scored Votes
The Quality of Bipartisan Legislation
Presidential Strategies in Statements of Administration Policy
What If You Could Pick the Pivot? Budget Reconciliation and Pivotal Politics in the Contemporary Congress
The 115th Congress and Questions of Party Unity in a Polarized Era
What Is Regular Order Worth? Partisan Lawmaking and Congressional Processes
Bill Text and Agenda Control in the US Congress
Laboratories of Politics
The Deaths of Ideas in Congress
Non-Party Government
The Concept and Measurement of Legislative Backsliding
Majority Party Agenda Setting
Unilateral Inaction
Bicameralism Hinges on Legislative Professionalism
Bicameralism and Minority‐Party Influence on Legislative Development
Putting the Brakes on Greased Wheels
The Personal or the Partisan? The Politics of House Appropriations Amendments, 1985-2016
If Congress Is So Dysfunctional, Why Is Its Staff So Busy? A Congressional Fellow’s Perspective
Interpersonal Relationships, Bipartisanship, and January 6th
Setting the Agenda
The Gingrich Senators
The Broken Branch
Agendas, alternatives, and public policies
Pivotal Politics
Issue-Advocacy versus Candidate Advertising
Insecure Majorities
Political Theater or Bargaining Failure
Congress, The Electoral Connection
A Meta‐Analysis of Campaign Contributions' Impact on Roll Call Voting
Political Life
How Interest Groups Select Issues for Rating Voting Records of Members of the U. S. Congress
Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response
Dominant Regimes and the Demise of Urban Democracy
Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto
Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness
Campaign Effects and the Dynamics of Turnout Intention in Election 2000
Does Political Advertising Persuade
Testing Theories of Congressional—Presidential Interaction with Veto Override Rates
Vetoes, Bargaining, and Boundary Conditions
The Politics of Attention
Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings
How Party Polarization Affects Governance
The Politics of Blame
On Measuring Legislative Agenda‐Setting Power
The Effects of Party- and PAC-Sponsored Issue Advertising and the Potential of Inoculation to Combat its Impact on the Democratic Process
| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,56 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |