Unilateral Inaction
Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301147 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Reeve (0000-0001-7217-6601, Washington University in St. Louis), Andrew Reeves (0000-0002-3728-6757, Washington University in St. Louis), Jon C Rogowski (0000-0003-4547-3832, University of Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 427-457 |
| Publication date | 2022-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12353 |
| OpenAlex | W3169785250 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 49 |
Presidents routinely overpromise and underdeliver, especially amid partisan polarization, narrow congressional majorities, and persistent gridlock. As Congress routinely stymies their legislative agendas, presidents consider alternative courses of action. We study public reactions to unilateral power in the context of congressional inaction. While some research suggests that presidents cannot afford to pass up opportunities to act, more recent scholarship indicates that the public holds negative views of unilateral power and disapproves of its use. Survey experiments conducted with a national sample of Americans provide evidence of the costs of unilateral power. Across three policy areas and between‐ and within‐respondent analyses, the public responds negatively when presidents exercise unilateral power rather than accept the status quo, even among individuals who share the president's policy views. Our results suggest that while legislative gridlock may increase the appeal of unilateral power, its use may come at a public cost
Context (archaeology · Gridlock · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidency · Respondent · Status quo · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Congress in Reverse
Thinking about the Presidency
Stealth Democracy
Managing the President's Program
Power without Persuasion
War and Democratic Constraint
Pushing the Agenda
Veto Bargaining
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians
Logistic or linear? Estimating causal effects of experimental treatments on binary outcomes using regression analysis.
Polarized America
Pivotal Politics
Insecure Majorities
Studying the Polarized Presidency
Public Perception of the Presidential Toolkit
Public Opinion Toward Presidential Power
Unilateral Action and Presidential Accountability
Up the Hill and Across the Aisle
The Electoral Cost of War
Partisan Bias, Political Information and Spatial Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election
Dividers, Not Uniters
Unilateral Powers, Public Opinion, and the Presidency
Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment
Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems
Public Preferences for Bipartisanship in the Policymaking Process
Rewarding Dysfunction
Strategic Position Taking and Presidential Influence in Congress
Legislative cohesion and presidential policy success
Presidential Unilateral Power
The Dysfunctional Congress
The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court
The Politics of Blame
Mobilizing the Public Against the President
To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
Leadership and Pandering
The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion
The Public Cost of Unilateral Action
Americans’ Attitudes About the Senate Filibuster
The President, Congress, and Legislation
Accountability for the Local Economy at All Levels of Government in United States Elections
Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election
Dynamic Representation
The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs
Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson
Increasing Precision without Altering Treatment Effects
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |