Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301263 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Barber (0000-0002-1576-2839, Brigham Young University), Alexander Bolton (0000-0001-7965-1858, Emory University), Sharece Thrower (0000-0002-6136-2369, Vanderbilt University) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 515-548 |
| Publication date | 2019-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12232 |
| OpenAlex | W2909232621 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 42 |
Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems
Argument (complex analysis · Divided government · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Separation of powers · Unilateralism · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Holding back the damage
Contemporary U.S. Policymaking
Assessing policy capacity and policy effectiveness
Preemptive Action
Comparing Three Measures of Legislative Professionalism
Are Voters’ Preferences Being Ignored in Governor’s Agendas
War power through restraint
Revisiting the virtues of veto point
Attention to the Covid‐19 Pandemic on Twitter
Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis
Larger Legislatures and the Cost of Political Brokerage
What Americans Know About Statehouse Democracy
Preemption in the Intergovernmental Trenches
Persistent unilateral action
Unilateral Inaction
Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism
Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of Budget Expertise on State Fiscal Responsibility
Presidential Unilateral Power
Gridlock, Bureaucratic Control, and Nonstatutory Policymaking in Congress
Why do some populist presidents erode liberal democratic institutions more than others in Latin America
Legislative strength and democratic satisfaction in presidential democracies
The Power of American Governors
Power without Persuasion
Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency
Veto Bargaining
Deliberate Discretion?
Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994
The presidential power of unilateral action
Pivotal Politics
With the Stroke of a Pen
Circumventing Adversity
Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises
The Contemporary Presidency
By Order of the President
National Forces in State Legislative Elections
Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency
Executive Orders and Presidential Power
Measuring Gubernatorial Budgetary Power
The Measurement of the Partisan Balance of State Government
Party Competition and Conflict in State Legislatures
Executive Orders and Administrative Control
The Politics of Executive Orders
Gubernatorial use of executive orders
Constraining Executive Action
The Politics of Blame
To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity
Constitutional Qualms or Politics as Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action
Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism
Gubernatorial Midterm Slumps
The Public Cost of Unilateral Action
The Elusive Search for Presidential Power
Decision Making in Political Systems
Revisiting the Two Presidencies
Reexamining the Use of Unilateral Orders
Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions
The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 21 |