How Responsive Are Legislators to Policy Information? Evidence from a Field Experiment in a State Legislature
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300874 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam Zelizer (0000-0003-3195-2736, Columbia University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 595-618 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12206 |
| OpenAlex | W2811079783 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 32 |
Theories of legislative committees, lobbying, and cue‐taking assume information affects legislators' support for policy alternatives. However, there is little direct, empirical evidence to support this foundational assumption about legislative behavior. This article reports results from a field experiment in which state legislators were randomly assigned to receive policy research about pending proposals. Results show that policy information increased aggregate cosponsorship by 60% above baseline rates. For one bill covered critically, information diminished cosponsorship and roll‐call voting support. Results are broadly consistent with information signaling models' predictions about the importance of information to position taking
Economics · Field (mathematics · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Public economics · State (computer science · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
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Personality and knowledge mobilisation
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The Myth of Academics’ Non-interference in Legislatures
Policy learning over the legislative process
Talking Shops
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Congressmen's Voting Decisions
Information and Legislative Organization
Considerations on representative government.
Strategic Information Transmission
Lobbying and asymmetric information
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Stalemate
Measuring State Legislative Professionalism
Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the U.S. House
Commitment and Consequences
Cosponsoring Legislation in the U. S. Congress
Estimating Proposal and Status Quo Locations Using Voting and Cosponsorship Data
Legislative Success in a Small World
Setting the Legislative Agenda
Beyond the Roll-Call Arena
Connecting the Congress
The Politics of Attention
Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics
Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll‐Call Ideal Points
Dirty Pool
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
Information and Influence
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation
Dynamics of Cosponsorship
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress
The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |